Introduction
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the largest emissions permits cap and trade market (Ellerman & Buchner, 2007) , will undergo a radical change in Phase 3. Allocation methodology will shift from grandfathering to a combination of auction-based and free benchmarkbased allowances allocation. Roughly, electricity generators, so far representing about two thirds of the Scheme's emissions, will not be allocated free European Union Allowances (EUAs) as stipulated in article 10a3 of the EU ETS Directive. Free allocation will be devoted to non-electricity generators (most of them being installations of the manufacturing sector) and will be transitional. They will receive a decreasing amount of free allowance through the Phase, with a target of no free allocation by 2027 (EC, 2011a) . Consequently, Phase 3 will inaugurate a new market configuration where the value of emission permits is redistributed among market participants and public authority: allowance auctioning will progressively become the allocation standard, and emission permit primary and secondary markets will coexist. This will cause a change in the emission permit supply and demand structure and thus in permit transfers in between actors.
The shift from free allocation to auctions has been retained as the main change in allowance allocation.
However, transitional free allocation will still represent an important share in Phase 3's cap and, as such, deserves specific attention, all the more that the amount of allowances to be auctioned in Phase 3 corresponds to all allowances that will not be allocated for free. This policy note thus focuses on transitional free allocation associated to the move from grandfathering to benchmarking and continues as follows: allocation redistribution among and installations' allocation entitlements interdependence are presented as the main implications of benchmarks in section 2. Section explains why benchmarks, as defined by the European Commission (EC), are potentially flawed already; due to the still presence of grandfathering and the introduction of the carbon leakage exposure provision. Last part concludes.
Two implications of switching to benchmarking
The introduction of benchmarks in Phase 3 of the EU ETS aims at addressing the main two drawbacks of grandfathering: first, the paradox where biggest polluters are treated the same way as the smallest, by now basing free allocation partly on CO 2 emission intensity (the amount of emitted CO 2 emissions per unit of output); second, sectoral distortion involved by National Allocation Plans -that have been in use in the first two Phases of the Scheme -by establishing harmonized Union-wide rules for transitional free allocation ). Indeed benchmark-based allocation involves a reduction associated with a redistribution of allocations among installations of a same sector (2.1). The intensity 3 of this redistribution is further affected by the Union-wide rule that limits the total annual amount of free emission permits to be allocated (2.2) 1 .
2.1.Allocation is reduced and redistributed
Benchmarks have involved an allocation level downward momentum as most installations are less efficient than benchmark values. For those that are more efficient, increase in allocation levels compared to Phase 2 occur leading to "allocation redistribution". The analysis of France's National Implementation Measures (NIM) provides a concrete illustration of these two phenomena on manufacturing industries.
At the sectoral aggregated level, manufacturing industries see a rather homogeneous allocation variation rate, similar to that of the manufacturing sector taken as a whole -except the pulp and paper (resp. refining and glass) industry which undergo a smaller (resp. larger) allocation reduction. Also, most of the manufacturing sector's allocation decline (in EUAs) occurs in three sectors: other nonmetallic mineral products, basic metals and oil refining (Table 1) . Allocation redistribution involved by benchmarks is assessed focusing on variations at the installation level. Although net variation is negative for the aggregated manufacturing sector as well as its subsectors mentioned in Table 1 , it results in a combination of allocation increases and reductions: the 1 Section 2 aims at providing a sense of the changes that are involved by the shift from grandfathering to benchmarks rather than providing technical aspects of benchmark-based free allocation in details. Interested reader can find such technical details in (Lecourt, 2012 situation for each installation can differ significantly from the sectoral picture depending on its location on the CO 2 intensity curve relative to the benchmark value, as illustrated in (Pauer, 2012) .
In the case of the French NIM, it can be observed that allocation increases are marginal and that total reductions are thus very close to sectoral net allocation variations (Table 2 ). This is in line with the way product benchmarks have been defined: a given product benchmark corresponds to the average CO 2 intensity of the 10% best performing installations, for the production of the benchmarked product in question. Consequently, only installations that are more efficient than benchmarks witness an increase in allocation. The pulp and paper industry stands out as the net reduction of 90 kEUAs from Phase 2 to 2013 hides similar and larger reduction and increase in allocation (1 341 kEUAs and 1 250 kEUAs respectively).
Although several product benchmarks are used in the pulp and paper industry 4 (involving allocation redistribution based on installations' performances relative to these product benchmarks), the main factor accounting for this remarkable redistribution pattern is the rule change in the allocation for emissions related to heat exchanges, which is concomitant to the introduction of benchmarks in Phase 3. Under this new rule, free allocation is now given to heat producers under specific circumstances only and, as a general rule allowances are allocated to the heat consumer to ensure that the their amount is independent from the heat supply structure (EC, 2011c) . Since the industry is a high heat consumer some installations see their average Phase 2 allocation multiplied several times in 2013 (Table 3 ).
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2.2.NIM's preliminary amounts can be further cut down by adjustment factors
Harmonizing transitional free allocation rules in Phase 3 involves that the amount of allowances to be allocated for free is now annually capped at the Union level, rather than at the national level.
Preliminary Amounts (PAs) are determined at the installation level based on benchmarks, without consideration of any cap. As such, should their sum exceed the annual maximum amount of allowances to be allocated for free, PAs will be applied an annual Cross Sectional Correction Factor (CSCF) to bring their sum back to the annual cap, which would further accentuate the aggregated allocation reduction observed in section 2.1. 
Two potential flaws of implemented benchmarking
Although benchmarks target installations with higher efficiency, the "historical dimension" that has been criticized in grandfathering will remain in Phase 3 with the use of historical activity levels (HALs) in the determination of PAs. This is made more obvious in a context of economic downturn 6 Installations that have more efficient than benchmarks receive a larger share of their emitted CO2 emissions in allocation (and vice versa). All things held equal (production levels identical to HALs, physical capital, carbon price feedback etc.), benchmark-based allocation has led to the expectation of most manufacturing installations (and thus the manufacturing sector as a whole) being allocated less free allowances than the emissions corresponding to their activity levels (due to most installations having CO 2 intensities above benchmarks values). However, the economic recession has strongly affected European Union's activity levels since 2008, making current ones below those from which HALs have been defined. As a consequence, the manufacturing sector will receive in Phase 3's first years, depending on the economic recovery, a greater share of its emissions in free allowances than if the economic recession had not happened. Figure 2 provides an illustration of this for the French manufacturing sector, where its aggregated emissions level stands below its 2013 free allocation amount.
7 HAL is defined is the highest production level median between the 2005-08 and 2009-10 periods. 8 i.e. in the simple and specific case where the installation in question only produces a product for which a product benchmark exists. At the installation level, it even can be observed that installations with larger CO 2 emission intensity than benchmarks receive more allowances than their actual emission levels as illustrated in the case of French cement producing installations (Figure 3 ). First their CO 2 intensities have been determined (Equation 1) so they could be compared to the grey clinker product benchmark value.
(1) Then, their PAs have been compared to their 2011 emission levels. This comparison exercise shows that about two thirds (17 out of 27) of cement producing installations above the grey clinker benchmark value (except non-circled Ciments Calcia and the arrowed three installations) hold allocation amounts above their 2011 emission levels (figures are provided in Table 7 of the annex).
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However, a provision has been introduced to exempt from the application of annual CLEF installations belonging to some sectors and subsectors that are considered deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage 10 . Such installations are instead applied a CLEF equal to 1 each year of Phase 3, meaning that their annual allocation entitlement stays constant and equal to their PA (absent any application of CSCFs).
Therefore, the underlying questions are how are these allocation amounts, not subject to transitional free allocation, taken care of in 2021? How will the "carbon leakage exposure" provision be conciliated with the view of no free allocation in 2027? These interrogations are all the more relevant given that, based on the French NIM, most of free allocation in the manufacturing sector are related to installations considered at risk of carbon leakage, that is, a large share of 2013 free allocation will still be allocated free of charge in 2020 (Table 5) . As a result, total preliminary amount in 2013 decreases by 1.4% in 2020 only, as opposed to the wide spread belief of a 63% decrease in free allocation throughout Phase 3 11 . So far, no indication has been given, either in the EU ETS Directive or the benchmarking Decision, about the outcome of carbon leakage free allocation when Phase 3 ends, or in 2027 where no free allocation is targeted. 
Conclusion
Phase 3 of the EU ETS will start on new allowance allocation grounds as auction is supposed to become the basic principle for allocation. Nevertheless, transitional free allocation remains for nonelectric generators (most of them belonging to the manufacturing industries) and allocation based on benchmarking will replace grandfathering, thus targeting most efficient installations as opposed to largest emitters. Two main implications of this shift to benchmarks have been identified: first, free allowances will be redistributed among installations as benchmarks outperforming installations should see their entitlement increase and less efficient installations see the largest declines; second, an installation's final free allocation amounts will depend on all others'.
It was also identified two features of the benchmarks design that could question the actual efficiency of the newly introduced and complex allocation system. First, the still use of historical reference levels (now of production rather than emissions) for the allocation amount determination, highlighted by the economic recession, suggests that the critics (e.g. over-allocation) that faced grandfathering in the Scheme's first two Phases are only partly addressed with benchmarks, which contributes to the ex ante versus ex post allocation discussion. Second, the provision for installations that are considered exposed to carbon leakage, which consists in keeping their free allocation entitlement constant throughout the Phase, significantly reduces the free allocation transitional character. The ways these large free amounts, reported from 2013 to 2020, are dealt with until 2027, where no free allocation is aimed at, is not addressed in official documents yet.
Finally, although benchmarks are challenging as they represent current 2007-08 best practices in Europe, it remains that they are used until 2020. One may wonder whether historical business as usual CO 2 intensity improvements would not lead to outperforming benchmarks before 2020. 
6.2.Estimation of Phase 3 free allocation annual maximum amounts
The EC has defined a limit for the allocation of free allowances to non-electricity generators ) in each year of Phase 3. In a nutshell, this maximum annual amount is composed of two elements:
1. The annual EU ETS cap in Phase 3 (not including sector and gas coverage extension) multiplied by the share of emissions from installations covered in Phase 2 and not considered electricity generators, in Phase 1 average verified emissions;
2. The amount of allocation corresponding to the emission coverage perimeter extension.
The maximum amount of free allocation in 2013 can be estimated using a combined database derived from CITL verified emissions and NACE code attribution to EU ETS installations (EC, 2009).
Installations with NACE codes belonging to the mining and quarrying (section C) and manufacturing Thus, a potential maximum amount of free allowances for installations belonging to the manufacturing sector is obtained summing both quantities a) and b). This amounts to 792 million allowances in 2013, annually declining by a constant amount estimated at 15 million. 
6.4.Definitions of acronyms and technical terms
Annual maximum amount: maximum amount of free allowances to be annually allocated. It corresponds to the annual "cap" of free allowances. However it may not be allocated in its entirety since the annual amount of free allowances that will be allocated is the minimum between the annual maximum amount and the sum of preliminary amounts. The methodology to determine these annual amounts is defined in article 10a of the consolidated EU ETS Directive. An estimation of the maximum amount of free allowances to be allocated in 2013 is provided in annex 6.2.
CLEF (Carbon Leakage Exposure Factor): annual factor that is applied to preliminary amounts. It ranges from 0.8 in 2013 and linearly decreases to 0.3 in 2020. It is used to make Phase 3 free allocation transitional. This factor is equal to one every year of Phase 3 for preliminary amounts of installations to are considered at risk of carbon leakage (i.e. free allocation is constant for them in Phase 3).
CSCF (Cross Sectional Correction Factor): annual factor, applied to preliminary amounts, which ensures that the amount of free allowances to be allocated in a given year is below the maximum amount of the corresponding year. NIM (National Implementation Measure): National document that contains, among other, the preliminary amounts of installations participating in Phase 3. This document had to be submitted to the European Commission for assessment.
HAL (Historical Activity
PA (Preliminary Amount): amount of free allocation of an installation participating in Phase 3, derived from benchmarks and historical activity levels (HALs). It serves as the basis for an installation's free allocation over Phase 3. It is named preliminary as it may be modified (e.g. application of cross sectional correction factor, carbon leakage exposure factor) as required by the European Commission, before becoming final amount.
